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‘He is an excellent man, as skilful, clever and versed in Holy Scripture as a cow in a wal-
nut tree or a sow on a harp’, quipped Martin Luther in his attack on the Catholic Duke 
Heinrich of  Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel published in 1541. Humour’s role in German 
history is well documented: the biting satire and ribald humour of  Hans Sachs’ moralizing 
plays; Luther’s often coarse and abusive polemic; the theatrical and musical comedies of  
nineteenth-century Berlin; the Flüsterwitze (whispered jokes) told under National Socialism, 
to name just a few examples. Yet as contemporary Anglophone scholars who encounter 
the New Year ritual of  Dinner for One during research trips to Germany know, humour is a 
complex and elusive phenomenon. Its study has a long and distinguished pedigree, rang-
ing from Freud on jokes and the unconscious, and Mikhail Bakhtin on the carnivalesque, 
to numerous more recent literary, anthropological and historical works. Some humour 
transcends time: Luther’s insults now have a significant following on the internet. Other 
humour does not: the sixteenth-century habits of  laughing at physical deformity and 
keeping dwarves at court, for example, or the popularity of  minstrel shows in nineteenth-
century America. In asking what made people laugh and why, we take a step closer to 
understanding the social and political norms of  a period, both official and unofficial, and 
the role of  groups and individuals in constructing and subverting those norms. Following 
a lively social gathering at which the merits or otherwise of  Dinner for One divided scholarly 
opinion greatly, GH’s co-editors, who take such matters very seriously indeed, decided 
to invite Peter Burke (Cambridge), William Grange (Nebraska-Lincoln), Martina 
Kessel (Bielefeld) and Jonathan Waterlow (Oxford) to take part in a forum to discuss 
the issues. We wish the journal’s readers happy holidays!
1. Humour has long been recognized as a key object of  study by aes-
thetic philosophers and literary scholars. To what extent can a historical 
reading of  the literary texts of  any disciplines across the ages enable 
historians to access more everyday cultures of  laughter?
Waterlow: It’s probably worth stating immediately that the scepticism historians 
who use humour in their work face from certain quarters regarding its significance as 
an object of  study is entirely undermined by the fact that humour has fascinated and 
been discussed by numerous disciplines since the beginnings of  written human history. 
Because of  this, we can use philosophic and literary texts as evidence that certain con-
cerns about the nature of  the human experience—social, philosophical, personal—are 
far from new and might therefore provide us with channels by which we can better 
understand and identify with past cultures.
More concretely, what texts like these can do for us is, first, provide us with a sense of  
the official or public norms of  the various forms of  humour in a given period; second, 
give an idea of  the issues of  the day that most occupied the attention of  thinkers, critics 
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and commentators, which they addressed either overtly through mocking humour or 
allegorically under the veil of  humorous abstraction; and third – because humour is 
often predicated on transgressions – reveal certain contemporary taboos and social ten-
sions via the act of  humorously violating them.
I think it’s a frustrating tendency in historical analyses to rely on the elite levels of  discus-
sions about humour from a given period under assessment. In the Soviet Union, Bolshevik 
thinkers argued themselves round in circles as to whether humour was an acceptable part 
of  the new revolutionary society, given that it was ‘clearly’ a weapon which could be used 
in violence between classes: should it exist at all in the ideal socialist society? At the ground 
level, however, ordinary citizens used humour in a far more ambivalent manner, frequently 
laughing at their own misfortunes rather than attacking other social groups.
These upper levels—both political and social—are of  course not hermetically sealed 
off from wider society; we can still find traces of  everyday ‘popular’ culture within their 
pages, even if  these will be fragmentary and divorced from much of  their living context 
(then again, this is the sort of  problem historians face with almost every other source, 
too). I think that humorous materials are particularly helpful in allowing us to recapture 
more of  that context, though: having retold various Soviet jokes in conference papers, 
only to be met with a stony silence and blank stares, I’ve often been asked, ‘Are these 
jokes actually funny?’ Well, they were considered to be funny at the time, so if  we’re 
not cracking up over them now, then we have to try to recover the context—social, cul-
tural, historical, political—that would have made them humorous to contemporaries. 
In short, if  we can find another time’s jokes funny, we take a significant step closer to 
understanding that period and the people within it.
Burke: As most of  us know from experience, jokes that work in some situations fall 
flat in others, while cultural historians are aware that what is considered funny changes 
over time. All those references to horns in Elizabethan plays tend to bore us now, but 
I suppose they must have brought down the house at the time. We need to recover the 
sense of  humour in one of  the many foreign countries called ‘the past’, but how do 
we do it? In my own study of  humour, mainly in early modern Italy, major sources of  
inspiration were, predictably for my generation I suppose, Mikhail Bakhtin on Rabelais 
and his World and Johan Huizinga on Homo Ludens. Both studies offer hypotheses that 
historians might try to test when investigating different cultures of  laughter. And so, 
obviously, does Freud in Der Witz und seine Beziehung zum Unbewussten, so does the Russian 
folklorist Vladimir Propp with his concept of  ‘ritual laughter’, and so do some anthro-
pologists such as Mary Douglas, writing on ‘joke perception’.
The great problem of  course, is how to deal with conflicting theories of  humour—
should we choose one and reject the others, should we try to combine them, or 
should we simply make use of  whatever seems to fit with the material from the 
particular culture of  laughter that we are trying to analyse? The work of  literary 
scholars is also helpful when we turn to the sources, from early modern Italy for 
instance: jest-books, such as the collection of  anecdotes about the Tuscan priest 
Arlotto Mainardi; stories, most famously Boccaccio’s Decamerone; reflections on what 
makes people laugh, some of  them to be found in Castiglione’s Cortegiano; parodies; 
nonsense verse and so on. I don’t think it too unfair to say that historians tend to 
read texts looking for ‘the’ meaning, while literary scholars, at least some of  them, 
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are aware of  multiple meanings. So historians may well have something to learn 
about the art of  reading from their literary colleagues. I’m thinking of  Bakhtin’s 
idea of  multiple voices within a text, of  the idea of  a ‘subtext’, underlying a given 
text, as well as more obvious double meanings. We might think that we know what 
a parody is, but if  we turn to a literary study such as Paul Lehmann’s Die Parodie im 
Mittelalter, we find, once again, a multiplicity of  meanings. Think of  the parodies 
of  the Vater Unser—are they essentially making fun of  a prayer, practising a kind of  
blasphemy? Or are they using the structure of  a well-known prayer in order to make 
fun of  something or, more probably, someone else. In similar fashion, when trying to 
gain access to past cultures of  laughter, historians are well advised to study images, 
Brueghel’s peasants for instance, and also the ways in which their colleagues in art 
history have interpreted these images. Since what made dead people laugh is elusive, 
we need every resource that we can find to approach it—iconographical, philologi-
cal, anthropological, psychological, and so on.
Grange: I find myself  unswayed and sceptical when the ‘meaning’ of  humour 
comes up. Hypotheses among psychologists, linguists, anthropologists and proctologists 
about the ‘meaning’ of  funny remain mostly unconvincing. The only real authorities 
on funniness are audiences. True, Günter Grass wrote funny lines—but I didn’t hear 
anyone laughing except me. In the same way, Stephen Hawking repeats a cosmological 
joke about St Augustine: ‘What was God doing during the millennia when homo sapiens 
was evolving and God had not yet appeared on the scene? He was constructing Hell 
for people who ask such questions!’ Do astrophysicists think this is funny? What about 
theologians? And if  they do, so what?
Many groups of  human beings, along with many subspecies of  related primates, have 
developed perceptual faculties for detecting threatening behaviour by learning to read 
vocal and visual cues. That ability among human beings has become an acute form of  
literacy, and some humans have evolved deep sensibilities in recognizing trustworthy 
tendencies among other members of  their species. Some tribes and clans, however, use 
laughter as a means of  obfuscation, and at times a strategy for survival. Sub-Saharan 
African tribes make laughter a significant component in the opening junctures of  meet-
ing strangers. Initial greetings are utterly superficial but they may form the basis of  a 
future relationship, which is often fundamental to continued mortal existence in Africa. 
From the inaugural moments, greeters express primal joy and congeniality. They 
extend hands of  greeting–but, not to offer a firm handshake. It is instead a metaphori-
cal attempt to tear off the other person’s hand, so vigorous is the gesture. Such vigour 
establishes a plane of  understanding for the proper rituals that should follow, which 
often include prolonged cascades of  loud laughter. Laughter is meant to convey a sense 
of  mutual, if  temporary trust.
Laughter in such instances may indicate some larger purpose, but it is neither literary 
nor aesthetic. Where then do historians or scholars turn to ‘access everyday cultures 
of  laughter?’ There essentially is no place to turn. There are no ‘places’ in the study 
of  laughter, no ‘sites’ where one may undertake an excavation of  cultural ‘epistemes’ 
to inform ourselves of  what people thought was funny. Few things are in any case less 
funny than a scholarly inquiry into what is, or was, funny. The best way to study funny 
is its opposite. A man was visiting church one Sunday morning, and the pastor was in 
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great form; his hearers laughed with gusto at his whimsy, which often introduced heavy 
theological topics. At the end of  the sermon, a woman sitting next to the man asked 
him, ‘What’s the matter? Didn’t you think the pastor was funny?’ Oh yes, the man 
replied. ‘I thought he was hilarious–but, I am not a member of  this parish’.
As this example indicates, laughter—or the lack of  it—may not serve so great a social 
purpose as we think. Individuals often laugh for reasons best known to themselves; no 
social, aesthetic or literary theory can pretend even to approach individual motivations 
for laughter. Consider laughter instead as something predicated on nothing more than 
one person’s song of  triumph. It expresses the laugher’s sudden discovery of  momen-
tary superiority over the person at or with whom he is laughing. It also explains his 
silence amidst tumultuous laughter in which he chooses not to take part.
Kessel: Studies about humour in European societies from antiquity onwards sug-
gest—as Jonathan has already mentioned—that humour was always considered a phe-
nomenon with the potential to test boundaries and taboos. Societies accordingly desired 
to control its appearance, its content, and the question of  who should either decide 
about or be associated with laughter, satire or ridicule. To my mind, philosophical, aes-
thetic or literary texts did not just comment on or highlight such processes, but formed 
an inherent part of  them. Take, for example, the definitions that Hegel used for satire 
and humour. He defined satire—which he associated with a critique of  the political 
situation of  the day—as an aesthetic format that would achieve neither ‘truth’ nor a 
poetic reconciliation of  art and ‘the real’, while humour—which he interpreted to mean 
acceptance of  the given—in his eyes aimed at healing frictions in society. By delegitimiz-
ing satire in both aesthetic and political terms, he drew on definitions put forward, for 
example, by Schiller and Fichte in the 1800s, who argued that humour meant the will-
ingness to fight for German unity, instead of  insisting on political reforms. Thus, Hegel’s 
system of  thought turned specific political preferences into philosophical abstractions 
and made others disappear.
Regarding the thorny questions Peter raises—how to choose, if  at all, among vari-
ous theories of  humour—I would agree that as historians we should use any possible 
resource. But beyond reading elite projections for silences and voids that might indi-
cate their desire not to touch upon what they feared or thought irritating, we could 
also question theories for the unspoken assumptions they are based upon. Take for 
example the well-known and established understanding of  humour as pointing out 
some sort of  incongruence. It is a common feature of  both premodern and modern 
‘classics’ about humour to associate the right and the ability to joke with masculinity, 
whereas women’s opportunities for speaking up humorously were normatively tightly 
circumscribed. This tendency on the part of  political and intellectual elites seems 
only to have grown in the age of  revolutions with the insistence on the incongruence 
between femininity and politics. In turn, women who tried to participate in politics in 
the nineteenth and twentieth century were regularly made the butt of  jokes that lived 
off that supposed incongruity between feminine bodies and the capacity for politi-
cal thought. Beyond making us aware of  the longevity of  norms and hierarchies in 
societies supposed to have undergone radical change, this issue should not necessarily 
render us wary of  the theory itself, but of  the problem that jokes may have fortified 
social constructions of  incongruence.
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2. In 1844, Theodor Mundt described popular humour as the 
‘Robespierre of  the Berliners’. To what extent has humour functioned as 
an agent of  subversion in German history? In imagining humour as the 
political resource of  the subaltern do we risk inadvertently reinscribing 
clichés about authority, bureaucracy and the absence of  humour?
Grange: Theodor Mundt’s use of  Robespierre as a kind of  grotesque metaphor 
is historically questionable. Maximilien de Robespierre was both serial killer and uto-
pian—a combination often deadly and seldom funny. Utopians strive to make the world 
a better place: in most instances they find little to laugh at, even as they proceed make 
the world more just, more equitable, more proportionate, more inclusive. Robespierre 
has had many emulators, none of  whom got the last laugh. They include Stalin and Pol 
Pot; too bad they and other such utopians never saw comedy in mid-nineteenth-century 
Berlin. Had they done so, they might have witnessed the genuine humour of  Berliners, 
when the unfortunate Theodor Mundt drew his analogy.
The 1840s were a decade when humour marched triumphant through 
Berlin, stopping mostly at the high altars of  laughter at the time: Joseph Kroll’s 
Etablissement in Tiergarten and Friedrich Cerf ’s Königstädtisches Theater am 
Alexanderplatz. In those venues the plays, skits, vaudevilles, couplets and routines 
of  Roderich Benedix, Gustav Räder, actor Karl Helmerding, and the astonishing 
playwright David Kalisch subtly shaved off layers of  Prussian pomposity. Few of  
their humorous efforts, however, functioned as subversion. While Robespierre used 
the ‘national razor’ of  the guillotine, Kalisch et al., particularly in the wake of  the 
1848 revolution, sharpened tiny razors of  satire in the satirical weekly Kladderadatsch 
to barber the pretentions of  Prussian military elites and reactionary Junkers. For 
their efforts, Kalisch and co-editor Rudolf  Löwenstein spent time in Spandau 
prison. Upon their release, Kalisch and Löwenstein confronted Berlin’s new and 
ill-humoured police chief  Karl Ludwig Friedrich Hinckeldey. Hinckeldey was so 
unhumorously inclined, in fact, that Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV raised 
him to the nobility in 1851. But Hinckeldey did not oppose humour on principle. 
He agreed that attending musicals, comedies and farces helped audiences ‘regain 
energies lost by hard work. Those who properly alternate recreation with work 
economize their brain power and are, therefore infinitely more practical than those 
who ignore or neglect recreation’.
Through the 1850s, the popular circulation of  Kalisch’s Kladderadatsch nevertheless 
quadrupled, while attendance at his comedies staged in the Theater in der Blumenstrasse 
expanded so substantially that its owner Franz Wallner built a luxurious new comic the-
atre near Alexanderplatz and named the facility after himself. By the time the Wallner 
Theater opened, however, Kladderadatsch had lost its edge, slicing less and less from hide-
bound aristocrats and landed gentry. Kladderadatsch at times even reattached dignity to 
some courtiers whom Kalisch and Löwenstein had earlier attempted to trim. Comedies 
at the Wallner Theater began to change the public image of  Junkers, portraying them 
as patriotic, brave, thrifty and public-spirited. They appeared in mixed casts of  many 
plays, depicting aristocrats and commoners freely intermingling and even marrying 
each other. Kladderadatsch by the 1860s embraced nationalism, and ultimately became 
a supporter of  Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck. Thus, in contradiction to 
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Theodor Mundt’s thesis, does humour become the unexpected maidservant of  power, 
homologizing clichés about bureaucracy and enshrining the legitimacy of  authority.
Burke: In the history of  every place or region that I know anything about, not 
only Germany, humour has functioned as—among other things of  course—a pow-
erful agent of  subversion. ‘Subversion’ is very much the appropriate word here, 
evoking vivid and dramatic images of  the world being turned upside down, whether 
temporarily, as in the case of  Carnival, or on what is supposed to be a permanent 
basis, as in the case of  revolutions. Luther and those of  his followers who made fun 
of  the Pope in words and images knew what they were doing, as Bob Scribner and 
other historians have suggested. They did not need Bakhtin to tell them that this 
kind of  comic ‘uncrowning’ had serious consequences, the destruction of  the enemy 
by means of  the explosive missiles of  humour. In the case of  secular politics, the 
army of  caricaturists and cartoonists who have been at work in Europe from the 
Thirty Years War onwards once again knew and know what they are doing, dissipat-
ing the charisma that comes with authority, pointing, like William Thackeray in a 
drawing of  Louis XIV, to the ordinary human to be found inside the royal robes. It 
might even be argued that the more authoritarian a given regime, the greater the 
opportunity it gives to subversive artists, dramatists (such as Václav Havel when 
he wrote The Memorandum)—or singers (Chico Buarque in Brazil under the mili-
tary regime, Pussy Riot in Putin’s Russia). I believe that for this reason the age of  
‘People’s Poland’ was a golden age in at least one respect, a golden age of  jokes 
against the regime. Hasn’t the quantity and quality of  these jokes declined since 
1989, or am I out of  touch with what’s going on these days? I haven’t forgotten that 
authoritarian regimes employ censors, reducing the volume of  what can be com-
municated officially or at any rate legally, but writers and artists living under these 
regimes learn to say what they want to say in an indirect manner—the ‘method of  
Aesop’—and equally importantly, their audiences or spectators learn to look for 
subtexts and double meanings.
No, I don’t think that making these points assumes that the authorities and their 
bureaucracies are always humourless—some politicians at least like to collect jokes 
about themselves. Of  course, as usual in history, there is another side to the coin. Like 
Carnival—once again!—political jokes may act as a safety valve, may help to reconcile 
people to a regime that they dislike. Have a laugh and carry on. I sometimes wondered 
whether in some office in some ministry in Warsaw there was not a department of  
political jokes, staffed with bureaucrats working hard to produce jokes against them-
selves in order to keep the people happy.
Waterlow: I think the principal risk is not the reinscription of  clichés about bureau-
cracies, but continuing to leave unquestioned the subversive power of  ordinary people’s 
humour. Over the years spent studying everyday humour under a repressive regime, 
I’ve come to be very sceptical of  the suggestion that it has any real political power, at 
least in terms of  altering the regime it mocks.
The danger here for historians is of  confusing affect with effect: satirical humour 
exchanged between citizens can and does serve to change how those citizens feel 
about the regime, themselves, and the relation between the two, but while this is vitally 
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important to recognize and to analyse, it should be understood from the perspective 
of  adaptation and critical engagement, rather than of  direct action which alters the 
external world. As such, this is both more than the ‘safety valve’ effect Peter mentions, 
but also less than the kind of  hefty subversion that turns the world upside down in any 
measurable, publicly visible way. Rather, this is something closer to Stoicism than to a 
revolutionary credo; instead of  striving to change the external world, one alters how 
one responds to and understands it.
Often, claims made in memoirs or interviews that one told anti-regime jokes—whether 
or not these claims are true—are just another element of  latter-day self-exculpation, of  
varnishing one’s (perfectly understandable) apathy, ambivalence, or self-interest with 
the sheen of  ‘passive resistance’. Hence we find implausibly large numbers of  people 
claiming publicly, or just to their families, that they were in the French Resistance, or 
were never in a Nazi organization. Joking here functions as a handy salve for uneasy 
consciences and helps draw a personal line of  continuity between two very different 
socio-political paradigms.
Governments and bureaucracies certainly do not enjoy being laughed at (but then, 
as William noted, neither do utopians or, we might add, anyone other than profes-
sional comedians), and their displeasure is often more visible to us in the historical 
record than is any sense of  how the joke-tellers themselves understand and experi-
ence their actions. Consequently, I think it’s easy to overstate the case for the power 
of  popular mockery: being afraid of  something does not mean that it’s objectively 
dangerous, and I’ve yet to hear a convincing example of  a regime toppled by the 
humour of  its citizens. To be sure, various people have claimed that, for example, the 
Soviet bloc was weakened—even fatally—by the rich culture of  political joke-telling 
which flourished in its various states, but I would argue that these jokes were symp-
toms rather than causes of  a coming political upheaval and eventual collapse. To put 
it crudely, the Berlin Wall came down because people demolished it, not because they 
joked about it.
Kessel: To interpret humour as subversion has a tradition just as long as the 
opposite definition, namely to see humour as a means to stabilize social and politi-
cal norms. Both are valid although I  do agree with both Peter’s and Jonathan’s 
scepticism regarding wit’s power to change political regimes. Often, however, 
humour can be both at the same time, and sometimes it is neither, but something 
altogether different.
In the media explosion before and during the German revolution of  1848, satire 
indeed played an important role as a form of  critique and subversion, as has often 
been argued. The journalist Adolf  Glaßbrenner, for example, used the figure of  
‘Nante’, the ‘man on the street’, to comment on politics and stretch the realm of  
the permissible, promptly being driven from Berlin for his insistence on free speech. 
However, precisely because satire now played a role as political commentary, as it 
had done in England since the eighteenth century, conservatives did not want to 
leave the arena of  the supposedly non-earnest to their opponents. In the political 
thawing of  the 1860s, for example, Prussian conservatives established their own 
satirical magazine, aptly entitled Der kleine Reactionär (The Little Reactionary), although 
it did not survive for long. I don’t know about Communist Warsaw, Peter, but in Nazi 
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Berlin, publishers were indeed producing the kind of  Goering jokes favoured by the 
population at the time. We should therefore be careful not to associate humour and 
satire automatically or only with liberal or democratic positions or the underdogs in 
society. Furthermore, as Martin Baumeister has pointed out, the projection of  the 
‘man on the corner’ as the watchful commentator of  oppressive politics, as the work-
ing classes’ incarnation of  agency, and as the victim of  unacceptable social condi-
tions, was not a ‘natural’ feature of  any given class but the product of  an increasingly 
differentiated culture industry. A heterogeneous mass public, confronted with rapid 
social change and political options, catered to a popular culture that also served to 
present role models.
Furthermore, I would argue that humorous comments in certain contexts can be 
interpreted from a governmental perspective as a practice that was neither meant nor 
understood as subversive but as a legitimate way of  taking part in politics. To this day, 
German cultural memory cherishes the idea that oral jokes in National Socialism sym-
bolized the everyday resistance of  non-Jewish Germans. I would suggest understand-
ing that notion as an extremely successful form of  memory construction. Most of  the 
jokes that were indeed told openly by non-Jews during Nazism could not be mentioned 
publicly after 1945 because they would have undercut the postwar, non-Jewish self-def-
inition of  not having known anything about exclusion, persecution and the Holocaust. 
So it may be helpful to study the realm of  laughter as one possible indicator for various 
forms of  governmental agreement between rulers and ruled who negotiated through 
joking their desired form of  participation in an authoritarian society and reminded 
their government of  the promises it held out to those who still counted as citizens.
3. The capacity of  laughter to include and exclude, to stabilize and 
destabilize authority, to mobilize or dissipate anger, is commonplace 
knowledge. Does its historical study merely permit the illustration by 
other means of  narratives that are already familiar, or does it offer the 
possibility of  writing particular histories differently? What else, in other 
words, does it help us to understand that we might not otherwise grasp?
Burke: I think that this question of  illustration versus understanding might be 
approached along two paths, one that comes from studies of  laughter in general and 
the other from particular historical problems. Looking at studies of  laughter in general, 
based for the most part, though not entirely, on evidence from western countries in 
the present or the recent past, a historical approach leads to a more acute awareness 
of  variety in the aims and methods of  inclusion, exclusion, stabilization, destabiliza-
tion and so on. To take an example from the discussion of  humour in one of  the most 
famous texts from the Italian Renaissance, Castiglione’s Cortegiano (1528), written by 
one of  the most civilized individuals of  the period and addressed to other civilized indi-
viduals. In this dialogue, one of  the speakers argues—without being contradicted—that 
it is natural to laugh at human deformity. In other words, an attitude that shocks us 
today was taken for granted in the sixteenth century. It wasn’t an eccentric attitude, as 
the important place of  midgets at court reminds us. So we need history, especially the 
history of  relatively remote periods, to remind us of  the variety of  moral standards in 
general and of  standards in joking in particular.
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The second approach focuses on ‘particular histories’, asking whether or how they 
are illuminated by introducing laughter into the story. Since the relation between laugh-
ter and authority is a recurrent problem, let me take the case of  Louis XIV, especially 
the image of  the king (it would of  course be equally possible to take an example from 
German history, but I prefer to stick to what I know more about). Our image of  the king 
is largely derived from the official image-making of  the time, a time when unusual efforts 
were made to present the king in what it would be an understatement to call a ‘favour-
able light’, since he was described as omniscient, omnipotent, always victorious, just, and 
so on, indeed as ‘Louis the Great’. Of  course historians want to know how successful this 
campaign of  what it is convenient if  anachronistic to call ‘propaganda’ may have been 
at the time. An indirect answer to this question is provided by a few surviving unofficial 
and unfavourable images, always satiric and sometimes parodic. These contemporary 
invitations to laugh at Louis act as a powerful reminder of  resistance to his regime. Most 
of  the surviving texts and images of  this kind were produced abroad (by the Dutch, the 
Germans and the English), but there is a little evidence of  French reactions. For example, 
a statue of  the king in Paris, glorifying him, was soon surrounded with railings to prevent 
obscene graffiti appearing on the pedestal. In short, the evidence of  laughter helps to 
take us behind the scenes and so view the theatre of  royal power from a different angle.
Kessel: It may be that these insights are common knowledge. However, I  think 
that shedding light on processes of  inclusion and exclusion by asking questions about 
laughter is no mean feat. To exclude through laughter and derision is quite a different 
historical phenomenon from organizing social positioning through, say, specific legal 
or linguistic requirements for nationality, by asking for particular professional expertise 
for certain positions, or by demanding income for social status. Thus, as Peter just 
suggested, listening to laughter in history makes us more aware of  the specific ways 
in which historical actors actually did include or marginalize others and how they did 
attribute or withhold cultural and social capital.
In that sense, laughter can have a powerful political meaning beyond any specific 
content. Taking humour seriously acknowledges the role emotions play in modern his-
tory, and thus also raises questions about our basic understanding of  the modern. For 
example, using irony or sarcasm can shift a discussion from the level of  argument to the 
arena of  emotions, making it hard to answer or impossible to gear social interaction 
back to argumentative procedures agreed upon precisely to control emotional dimen-
sions in politics. Furthermore, it might almost be a truism nowadays that laughter can 
be the spark for violence. The various historical meanings of  this connection, however, 
still need to be analysed, especially as the recognition of  laughter as a historical phe-
nomenon might help us understand how, in democratic societies too, groups negotiate 
identity and belonging through categories of  honour and shame. In a more general 
sense yet, using humour as a category of  historical analysis allows us to see not only 
how it entertained, but also how it worked as a cultural practice that shaped social 
order through shared assumptions about society and politics. In other words, the ways 
in which people deal with laughter point us to the ‘sacred cows’ of  a given society, 
dispositions held so dearly that historical actors would not allow anybody to make fun 
of  them, or, if  they did, it was at the cost of  remaining an outsider or under threat—a 
phenomenon clearly visible today also.
 
618 Forum
Finally, I understand anecdotes or jokes as elements of  what I call an ‘everyday histo-
riography’, as the ‘smallest minimal unit of  the historiographic fact’ (Joel Fineman). Of  
course, they may not convey anything beyond the entertaining moment. Then again, 
they may offer an unobtrusive yet expressive opportunity for taking part in the perma-
nent act of  making society. They translate imaginations of  the real, convey people’s 
projection of  their past, and tell us about hopes and fears of  things to come. By narrat-
ing or enacting jokes, historical actors indicate how they want their status to be secured, 
how others should speak to them, and how they judge or grant power and honour.
Waterlow: I’ll try to answer this through the example I know best—Stalin’s Soviet 
Union—which I think bears some relevance to German history, too.
Two principal trends in the historiography that sought to understand how ordinary 
citizens lived through and understood the Stalin years can be simplified as either ‘citi-
zens were terrified into submission’, or ‘citizens came to believe in Communism as a 
substitute religion’. Even with the ‘archival revolution’ of  the 1990s, as the doors of  
those institutions were for the first time thrown almost completely open to researchers, 
social and cultural historians of  the Stalin years continued to circle the middle ground 
between those two poles of  total state coercion versus total state conversion without 
ever really defining it or its operation, settling for vague terms such as ‘grey zone’ or 
states of  ‘half-belief ’.
Humour can add a great deal more to our understanding of  how ordinary (that 
is, politically uninfluential) citizens perceived, grappled with, and ultimately came, by 
necessity, to normalize much of  the world around them during these years. Humour 
demonstrates that this was not (or not always) a case of  papering over the cracks 
between official rhetoric and lived realities, but rather an explicit confrontation with 
these disjunctures—not only viewing the theatre of  royal power from a different angle, 
as Peter puts it, but also reflecting critically on what that theatre meant when contrasted 
to both the claims made from the Royal Box (so to speak), and to the lived experience 
of  the majority.
For example, critical jokes are usually structured around a judgement in which the 
target is measured in some way (against its own claims, a familiar standard of  some kind, 
or an absurdly exaggerated version of  either) and is found wanting. Delving into what 
the standards of  judgements are that allow such jokes to function offers a very rich seam 
for historians to mine: to what alternative and/or traditional standards of  judgement did 
citizens continue to refer, and to what extent did they criticize the regime against its own 
proclaimed values, indicating thereby a degree of  acceptance of  those values?
What is most interesting about humour is the way it entangles these different dis-
courses and values, leaving us with a sense of  the lived experience of  contemporaries, 
rather than the kinds of  sources (pamphlets, newspapers, plays, and so on) that so often 
in the pursuit of  propagating or defending a particular position leave artificially seg-
regated the numerous moments where different values and ideas crosshatch with each 
other, rather than meeting head-on in conflict.
Martina raises the interesting point that humour can also move interpersonal inter-
actions, even when explicitly political in content, into the realm of  emotions. Although 
I’ve yet to find much of  interest in the ‘emotional turn’, I would agree that humour 
offers an important source for engaging with the desire of  individuals in the past to 
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create and nurture ‘trust groups’ outside mainstream, ‘official’ society. Under a repres-
sive regime, sharing a political joke with someone signalled an important judgement 
of  trust that they would not denounce you to the authorities. As such, humour of  
this kind can be a vital clue to the nature of  unofficial trust groups and channels of  
communication.
Grange: Humour has an inconsistent record of  destabilizing authority, especially 
if  the authority in question is well entrenched. Why? Individuals generally conform to 
social norms they see around them, norms which in most cases they inherited from pre-
vious generations. Subsequent generations usually fortify inherited rules, often endow-
ing them with supernatural meaning and intrinsic values. They do so with good reason: 
reinventing the wheel is usually a waste of  time, because it involves teaching each suc-
ceeding generation a new set of  rules. Institutions thus become constructions that limit 
individual freedom, whose rituals often sanctify inclusion or exclusion. They also tend 
to stabilize, since most humour offers an opportunity for escape.
Such rituals include theatre performance, especially the performance of  spoken 
comic drama. One major wrinkle of  comic effectiveness became apparent in fifth-
century Athens, namely parrhesia, the Athenian right ‘to speak freely and boldly’. No 
other Greek city state insisted on such freedom; yet without it, comedy could not have 
functioned as it did. Following the fifth century, the plays of  Aristophanes, Menander 
and their literary descendants became more than an institution. In the modern world, 
humour has become an industry.
One of  the best examples of  the German humour industry at work occurred with the 
abrogation of  censorship in the Weimar Republic. Comedies, comic reviews, cabarets 
and nightclubs began to feature all manner of  humorous performance, some of  which 
were topical and aimed at ‘changing the narrative’ in German political life. But those 
performances failed to destabilize much of  anything. In fact, they may have helped 
solidify and restore some institutions of  censorship and control, which until about 1926 
been in retreat. The antics of  topical comedians such as Karl Valentin, Liesl Karlstadt, 
Max Adalbert, Trude Hesterberg and Blandine Ebinger provided laughs aplenty, but 
they also stirred resentment. So did the music of  Friedrich Hollaender and the plays 
of  Bruno Frank.
When those resentments became public policy in the Third Reich, an unprecedented 
upsurge in comedy production took place. Comedies began to outnumber all other 
forms of  German dramatic performance. The production of  humour may unfortu-
nately have killed several comic performers; one example is Robert Dorsay, a well-
known cabaret star whose career prospects improved after the Nazis came to power. 
But he once complained in the Deutsches Theater canteen about whipped pastry top-
ping there, calling it ‘Adolf  Hitler Memorial Cream’. Secret police operatives shortly 
thereafter arrested and executed him for ‘anti-Reich activities’. The tragic fate of  
comedian Kurt Gerron is more well known. A member of  the original Brecht-Weill 
Threepenny Opera cast, Gerron was ultimately interned at the Theresienstadt concentra-
tion camp, where he performed songs from that show for SS guards and later com-
pleted a propaganda film, featuring many of  the camp’s children’s laughing and playing 
in the ‘model internment facility’. Five days after the filming was complete, the SS 
shipped both Gerron and the children to Auschwitz, where they perished upon arrival. 
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The study of  humour ex post facto, on the other hand, offers abundant range for histo-
rians to destabilize earlier concepts, especially from a theoretical standpoint. A good 
example of  comedy from the American theatre of  the 1830s to the 1880s is minstrelsy. 
Performers in blackface appeared throughout the country; there were at one time over 
twenty minstrel companies operating out of  New York. Today, performing in blackface 
is taboo—so politically incorrect that no one dares take it humorously.
4. Writing about the premodern carnivalesque from the perspective of  
1930s Russia, Mikhail Bakhtin emphasized that the sphere within which 
the freedom of  laughter can be exercised is sometimes broad and some-
times narrow. What expands and contracts that sphere, and what drives 
broader changes in the culture of  humour? What transforms its rules 
and norms?
Waterlow: A counterculture by definition requires a culture to counter—as such, 
it will always to some extent be conditioned by that which it negates, just as visions 
of  utopia carry with them what Eric Naiman has called the ‘indented characteristics’ 
of  the (in their authors’ view) imperfect societies and polities in which they originate. 
Hence the Carnival is not simply a world unto itself, but the familiar world turned 
upside down.
The recent psychological theory of  humour developed by Peter McGraw and the 
Humour Research Lab (HuRL) argues, in my view convincingly, that humour operates 
in essence via ‘benign violations’. To be funny, something must violate some kind of  
norm, rule or expectation, yet must still in an important sense be ‘benign’ rather than 
frightening or overly serious. Whether or not McGraw’s theory really does encompass 
all humour (it would be difficult to say definitively that one couldn’t eventually find an 
example which didn’t fit his framework), it does highlight a key point: humour is fun-
damentally calibrated by prevailing norms of  behaviour, taste and other social values. 
Therefore, as these change in a given society, so humour changes, too.
For Bakhtin, grotesque humour always contains within it simultaneous images of  
decay and rebirth and hence this folk laughter is ultimately part of  long-term cultural 
cycles of  death and renewal; while laughter debases and even destroys, he suggests, it 
is simultaneously creative and helps establish new perspectives. In this way, the sphere 
of  laughter expands and contracts in a constant and unending cycle. But what drives 
these changes? I  think it would be foolhardy to suggest we can talk of  quantitative 
changes in a culture’s humour, but in terms of  the quality and nature of  that humour, 
I would argue that the more serious, constricting and pious the official culture (whether 
enforced by social norms or actual laws), the sharper, more bitter and indeed more 
creative the population’s humour (the jokes really did get worse after 1989, Peter!). All 
the same, folk humour is a deeply ambivalent mode which ‘crowns and uncrowns at the 
same moment’: it oversteps official limits but, as it does so, it affirms that those bounda-
ries exist—it is funny because it is transgressive in some sense; if  it were not transgres-
sive (merely ‘benign’, in McGraw’s terms), it would not be funny.
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that political humour is solely defined by the 
regime it engages with; although it is a response to that regime, joke-tellers simulta-
neously draw on other sources and discourses—ranging from their own pre-regime 
  
Forum 621
experience to knowledge of  other countries and value systems—to take on and criticize 
the regime. In short, when criticizing a person or institution, one does so by reference 
not only to their self-representation or purported values, but also to one’s own values 
and worldview, which will have been shaped by sources outside and/or qualitatively 
distinct from those of  the regime. In short, you do not only ‘speak Bolshevik’ when 
mocking the Soviet regime, nor would all Germans speak (only) in the language of  the 
Volksgemeinschaft when criticizing Nazi social policies. Rather, it is in the confluence of  
these two streams that humour is brewed.
Burke: The reference to Russia in the 1930s prompts one kind of  answer to this 
question, about censorship and the official limits to laughter, the prohibitions, which 
clearly constrain humourists even if, as my answer to your second question about sub-
version suggested, they can also stimulate them to find ways to evade them. That is a 
rather obvious kind of  answer, though it would be interesting to develop it with case-
studies of  laughter in successive regimes—in Russia under the last tsars, for instance, in 
the early Bolshevik years, in the Stalinist years, after 1989 and so on.
But in my view at least, it is more illuminating to explore changes in unofficial taboos, 
the Freudian ‘censor’ inside us rather than the official censors of  the Austro-Hungarian 
empire that inspired Freud to coin his term. As a beginning, it might be useful to switch 
from one cultural theorist to another, from Mikhail Bakhtin to Norbert Elias. Elias 
never published an analysis of  laughter (although an essay of  his on the subject written 
in the 1950s was found quite recently), but it is not difficult to imagine how he would 
locate the history of  humour within his famous account of  the ‘civilizing process’, with 
its emphasis on increasing restraint. It is equally easy to find historical examples of  the 
‘civilizing’ of  laughter. One that I have already mentioned is the shift from laughing at 
physical deformities in the sixteenth century to the later disapproval of  such laughter. 
The study of  cartoons and caricatures in a particular place over the long term might be 
one of  the best ways to identify the civilizing process in action, and an obvious English 
example is the contrast between the freedom displayed by James Gillray and the self-
control shown by John Tenniel, whose caricatures of  Gladstone focused not on his face 
but on his ‘Gladstone collar’.
Of  course your question demanded explanation. Elias offered a complex, mainly 
political explanation of  the whole civilizing process in the second volume of  his book. 
Do we buy it? If  not, what do we put in its place? I have a feeling that as usual, Elias 
didn’t do justice to the power of  religion, and in the case of  Western Europe I’d 
want to say more about the Protestant ethic (worldly asceticism limiting the scope of  
humour) and about the similar Counter-Reformation or ‘Catholic puritan’ ethic as 
well. But we (like Elias in his later years) still face the problem of  explaining opposite 
trends, ‘decivilizing processes’ as he called them, including an expansion of  the sphere 
of  humour. Think of  England in the 1960s, at least as I  remember it. A  flourish-
ing of  satire (Private Eye, for instance, was founded in 1961) at a time of  increasing 
permissiveness, especially in the sphere of  sex, as acted out or represented (the Lady 
Chatterley trial and all that). Simple reaction against an age of  repression? Delayed 
reaction to the Second World War? I’m just speculating. To go beyond speculation, we 




Kessel: Structures or agency, fear or a society’s mental disposition to laissez-faire, 
power, violence or the rule of  law—I would argue that developments in any histori-
cally important dimension could initiate changes regarding the freedom of  laughter. 
Thus, I think the process can go many ways: satire may lose its cutting edge because its 
favourite subject goes out of  (political) fashion, jokes may turn sour because the social 
fabric in that particular context is wearing thin, mentalities may no longer allow certain 
types of  jokes, or a shift in the range and type of  media available may allow for entirely 
different ramifications of  satire, to name just a few. The reverse, however, may equally 
be the case—the very practice of  laughter, as a deeply political phenomenon, can trig-
ger or help to shape changes in society. Thus, the German middle classes in the late 
eighteenth century formed a culture that was intended to help them gain dominance 
over the aristocracy by carefully grooming laughter into a distinctive feature of  suc-
cessful social behaviour, projecting their bodily and emotional control as a sign of  cul-
tural superiority and as a coping mechanism regarding actual shortcomings in influence 
and prestige. With gruesome effect, the agreement among non-Jewish Germans during 
National Socialism to turn exclusion and destruction into a reality not only through vio-
lence but also through a systematic allowance for derision and spite towards the perse-
cuted, helped to turn those who were considered to ‘belong’ into an affective community 
that brutally censored jokes by the persecuted, but made great speaking room for itself.
In my view, therefore, we should be careful not automatically to associate certain types 
of  societies with greater freedom or repression of  laughter—certainly not in the modern 
world—but rather to ask specifically who drew the boundaries for whom and with what 
effect. Next to long-term changes that reflect the qualitative differences between pre-
modern and modern societies, I am fascinated by studying the non/liberty of  laughter 
because it points us to paradoxical processes in modern societies. Thus, the authoritar-
ian state of  Wilhelmine Germany protected the realm of  speech of  Jewish-German 
comedians as long as they did not satirize crown and altar. As a result, these professionals 
of  laughter often commented (self-)ironically on the tangled forms of  German-Jewish 
identity making, and, as Peter Jelavich has argued, inscribed themselves as German citi-
zens into the new nation precisely by doing so. In the political democracy of  Weimar 
Germany, however, their discursive options dwindled as the reduced role of  the state 
as the arbiter of  freedom of  speech combined with the conservative and anti-Jewish 
disposition of  many of  the state’s and society’s representatives to prove Jewish-Germans’ 
fear correct that their self-irony would only provide antisemites with fodder. Given such 
examples, I would suggest studying the frayed realm of  laughter as a possible indicator 
for the ways in which societies deal with the inherent ambiguity of  identity.
Grange: Martina makes a good point about the ‘non-liberty of  laughter’, which had 
a curious history in the Third Reich. Laughter was then an instrument of  what Detlev 
Peukert called the German ‘double life’, allowing most citizens to put on a pleasant public 
face while concomitantly inhabiting a private sphere, ‘pursuing non-political spare-time 
pleasures with minimal possible interference’. Laughter at home or shared with cronies 
at work is obviously distinct from laughter enjoyed at a comedy performance in a theatre. 
Laughter in the former, to paraphrase Suzanne Langer, is a direct response to what she 
called ‘separate stimuli’. The comic play, on the other hand, betokens what she calls a ‘lift 
in the vital feeling in each laughing audience member’, a result of  interconnected and 
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conjoined provocations. Comedy in a theatre expresses a kind of  communal mood—but 
then, most people attending a comedy do so with expectations of  laughing. But even if  
one enters the theatre in a bad mood, a play’s humour can often find fertile ground in 
which to take root and blossom. Humour in the theatre feeds off the responses of  others 
in the audience. What prepares the ground for laughter is the dramatic illusion and the 
willingness, even the eagerness of  the individual audience member to accept the illusion. 
The situation onstage is often preposterous (and often preposterously inane in most com-
edies during the Third Reich), yet a punch-line could result in an explosion of  laughter if  
the stage totality allowed it to seem natural and unforced.
To taste the freedom once experienced at the Feast of  Fools in medieval Europe, one 
had to travel (one still can, in fact) to the Bluffton Street Fair in northern Indiana, where 
Swiss-German farmers with names such as Aeschlimann, Klopfenstein, Emschweiler 
and Neuhauser brought their families to what was essentially a Jahrmarkt. Mechanical 
rides, apple pie booths and live pig races were among the amusements on offer. Police 
officers and fair marshals kept order as school bands marched through the streets, 
vendors offered new-fangled gizmos in a tent 200 metres long, and real estate brokers 
hawked land and houses. It was almost like the Carnival scene from Das Kabinett des 
Dr Caligari, the highly praised silent film of  1920 with Conrad Veidt as the spooky guy 
in the cabinet. But something almost as spooky was also about to happen in Indiana.
The Street Fair boasted something few other fairs in Indiana could offer: a live show 
called ‘The G-String Follies’, which offered audiences comprised mostly of  farmers 
and tractor salesmen the sight of  scantily clad women dancing alluringly inside a large 
tent, where raucous music beat an insistent rhythm that accompanied their movements. 
Though a large greasy man with tattooed arms guarded the tent’s entrance, deter-
mined boys could sometimes sneak in and witness the spectacle. On one occasion, the 
proceedings involved an event that was nothing short of  carnivalesque. A woman with 
dyed pink hair ecdysiastically danced for about ten minutes on a small, raised stage 
under glaring, exotic lights. At the conclusion of  her dance she stripped down to her 
G-string (as the show’s title promised), but on this occasion she briefly pulled down her 
G-string as well, breaking the local law but exposing pubic hair she had also dyed pink. 
The resulting uproar included laughter that exploded in a spontaneous concatenation 
of  frenzy and erotic adulation, like a July 4th fireworks rocket streaking high into the 
heavens over Indiana, fuelled by the brief  glimpse of  a woman’s pudendum. Most of  
the grown men on that occasion, along with all the young boys, experienced a carni-
valesque excursion to distant, forbidden territory. They had enjoyed an unprecedented, 
albeit circumscribed freedom along the journey, after which they returned to safety. 
The farmers and tractor salesmen continued to talk about it afterwards, as they gath-
ered outside the tent, eating sweet corn and candied apples.
What had just happened? A great change had taken place, one which Herbert Marcuse 
had earlier described as ‘a transformation of  the libido from sexuality constrained under 
genital supremacy to eroticization of  the entire personality’. The result at the ‘G-String 
Follies’ was a kind of  consciousness raising, a method that allowed eros to trump civili-
zation (from the title of  Marcuse’s 1955 book on the subject). What made this instance 
unique was how laughter combined with eros and rendered both acceptable and non-
threatening to authority. No one was arrested, the police and fair marshals continued on 
their rounds, and everyone proceeded to other, more traditional attractions.
  
